CISA | CYBERSECURITY AND INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY AGENCY

USING INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE (IOC) FOR INCIDENT RESPONSE



1



Agenda

Intro and Overview

- Course Description
- Learning Objectives
- Overview of IOCs

IOCs

- Use of IOCs
- Types of IOCs
- CHIRP Digital Forensic Video
- MITRE ATT&CK®
 Framework

Case Studies

- Numbered Panda
- Elfin
- Fancy Bear

Knowledge Check Key Takeaways Resources

Learning Objectives

Terminal Objective

Summarize the importance of indicators of compromise (IOCs) and how they are used during incident response

Enabling Objectives

- Define IOCs
- Explain why IOCs are important
- Identify types of IOCs and how they are used, with examples
- Describe the MITRE ATT&CK Framework for incident response and IOC analysis
- Identify Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) groups and recommended actions
- Provide example analysis of IOCs using the ATT&CK Framework





What are Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)?

An IOC is a clue that can be used to indicate an intrusion or compromise of a host in a network.





Overview: IOC vs. IOA

Indicator of Attack (IOA)	Indicator of Compromise (IOC)
Identified as the event or process is active and occurring. Focused upon attribution and intent of threat actors.	Provides Information about known adversaries after an event has occurred. Reactive incident response indicator used for detection of threats.



What does an IOC reveal?

IOC can reveal:

- Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) used during a cyberattack
- Severity of the event
- Where to focus incident response and mitigation
- Who the threat actors are





Introducing IOCs

A car dashboard provides real-time performance measures and safety indicator signals.

Like mechanics, incident responders use **indicators** to diagnose potential problems and determine how or why they occurred.





IOC and Digital Forensics

As per **NIST 800-53**, IOCs are forensic artifacts from intrusions identified on organizational systems at the host or network level

- Digital forensics is the application of scientific investigatory techniques to digital crimes and attacks.
- The Locard Principle: "Every contact leaves a trace"
- An IOC is the **trace** of the threat actor





Uses for IOCs

IOCs are a key source for:

- Identification of an Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) actor or group
- Indicating something is wrong on the network
 - Forensic identification of crime or attack
- Ţ
- Understanding how a compromise occurred
- Testing your system or network for vulnerabilities





Knowledge Check (1)

An IOC can reveal:

- □ Severity of an attack
- $\hfill\square$ Where the attack occurred
- □ Who is responsible
- Tactics
- □ All of the above



Ask the Audience (1)

Who has heard of the CISA Hunt and Incident Response Program (CHIRP) tool?



CHIRP

- CISA Hunt and Incident Response Program (CHIRP)
 - Forensics collection tool
 - Developed by CISA
 - Helps network defenders find IOCs associated with activity detailed in:

AA20-352A: Advanced Persistent Threat Compromise of Government Agencies, Critical Infrastructure, and Private Sector Organizations

AA21-008A: Detecting Post-Compromise Threat Activity in Microsoft Cloud Environments

Similar to Sparrow—which scans for signs of APT compromise within an M365 or Azure environment—CHIRP scans for signs of APT compromise within an on-premises environment.







CISA HUNT AND INCIDENT RESPONSE PROGRAM (CHIRP)

What is an Advanced Persistent Threat (APT)?

An adversary with sophisticated levels of expertise and significant resources, allowing it through the use of multiple different attack vectors (e.g., cyber, physical, and deception) to generate opportunities to achieve its objectives, which are typically to establish and extend footholds within the information technology infrastructure...

- NIST 800-39



Who has experience with the MITRE ATT&CK Framework?



The MITRE ATT&CK[®] Framework

The MITRE ATT&CK Framework consists of adversarial techniques that can be correlated to the Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) employed by the APT groups.

- A collection of multiple IOC that allow analysts to identify which perpetrators may be involved
- IOCs correlate to techniques in the framework, which are mapped to known APTs based on the capabilities employed
- To strengthen security, organizations can use these techniques to simulate the threat actor and identify vulnerabilities in their network
- Based on IOC findings, defenders can create and apply signatures to their Intrusion Detection System (IDS) or Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS) to identify or prevent future threat activity.






ATT&CK Matrix for Enterprise



>	Reconnaissance	Resource Development 7 techniques	Initial Access 9 techniques	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion 39 techniques	Credential Access	Discovery 27 techniques	Lateral Movement 9 techniques	Collection	Command and Control 16 techniques	Exfiltration 9 techniques	Impact
[Active Scanning (2)	Acquire	Drive-by	Command and	Account	Abuse Elevation	Abuse Elevation Control	Brute Force (4)	Account Discovery (4)	Exploitation of	Archive	Application Layer	Automated	, Account Access
	Gather Victim Host	Infrastructure (6)	Compromise	Scripting Interpreter (8)	Manipulation (4)	Control Mechanism (4)	Mechanism (4)	Credentials	Application Window	Remote Services	Collected Data (3)	Protocol (4)	Exfiltration (1)	Removal
	Information (4)	Compromise Accounts (2)	Exploit Public- Facing	Container	BITS Jobs	Access Token	Access Token Manipulation (5)	from Password I Stores (5)	Discovery	Internal	Audio Capture	Communication Through	Data Transfer Size Limits	Data Destruction
	Gather Victim Identity Information (3)	Compromise	Application	Administration Command	Boot or Logon Autostart	Manipulation (5)	BITS Jobs	Exploitation for	Browser Bookmark Discovery	Spearphishing	Automated	Removable Media	Exfiltration	Data Encrypted for Impact
	Gather Victim Network	Infrastructure (6)	External Remote Services	Deploy Container	Execution (14)	Boot or Logon Autostart	Build Image on Host	Credential Access	Cloud Infrastructure	Lateral Tool Transfer	Collection	Data Encoding (2)	Over Alternative	Data
	Information (6)	Develop Capabilities ₍₄₎	Hardware	Exploitation for	Boot or Logon Initialization	Execution (14)	Deobfuscate/Decode	Forced	Discovery	Remote Service	Clipboard Data	Data	Protocol (3)	Manipulation (3)
	Gather Victim Org Information ₍₄₎	Establish	Additions	Client Execution	Scripts (5)	Boot or Logon Initialization	Files or Information	Authentication	Cloud Service Dashboard	Session I Hijacking ₍₂₎	Data from Cloud Storage Object	Obfuscation (3)	Exfiltration Over C2	Defacement (2)
	Phishing for	Accounts (2)	Phishing (3)	Inter-Process Communication (2)	Browser Extensions	Scripts (5)	Deploy Container	Forge Web Credentials (2)	Cloud Service Discovery	Remote	Data from	Dynamic Resolution ₍₃₎	Channel	Disk Wipe (2)
	Information (3)	Obtain Capabilities ₍₆₎	Replication Through	Native API	Compromise	Create or Modify System	Direct Volume Access	Input Capture (4)	Container and Resource	Services (6)	Configuration Repository (2)	Encrypted	Exfiltration Over Other	Endpoint Denial of Service (4)
	Search Closed Sources (2)	Stage	Removable Media	Scheduled	Client Software Binary	Process (4)	Domain Policy Modification ₍₂₎	Man-in-the-	Discovery	Replication Through Berneyeble	Data from	Channel (2)	Network Medium ₍₁₎	Firmware
	Search Open Technical	Capabilities (5)	Supply Chain	Task/Job ₍₇₎ Shared Modules	Create	Domain Policy Modification (2)	Execution Guardrails (1)	Middle (2) Modify	Domain Trust Discovery File and Directory	Removable Media	Information Repositories ₍₂₎	II Fallback Channels	Exfiltration Over Physical	Corruption II Inhibit System
	Databases ₍₅₎ Search Open		Compromise ₍₃₎	Snared Modules Software	Account ₍₃₎ Create or Modify	Escape to Host	Exploitation for Defense Evasion	Authentication I Process (4)	Discovery	Software Deployment	Data from Local System	Ingress Tool Transfer	Medium (1)	Recovery
	Websites/Domains (2)		Relationship	Deployment Tools	System Process (4)	Event Triggered Execution (15)	File and Directory	Network	Network Service Scanning	Tools	Data from	Multi-Stage	Exfiltration Over Web	Network Denial of Service (2)
	Search Victim-Owned Websites		Valid Accounts (4)	System Services (2)	Event Triggered	Exploitation for	Permissions Modification (2)	Sniffing	Network Share	Taint Shared Content	Network Shared Drive	Channels	Service (2)	Resource Hijacking
			(4)	User Execution (3)	Execution (15)	Privilege Escalation	Hide Artifacts (7)	OS Credential Dumping (8)	Discovery	Use Alternate	Data from	Non-Application Layer Protocol	Scheduled Transfer	Service Stop
			Windows Management Instrumentation		External Remote Services		Hijack Execution	Steal	Network Sniffing	Authentication I Material (4)	Removable Media	Non-Standard	Transfer Data	System
				Hijack Execution	Flow (11)	Flow (11)	Application Access Token	Password Policy Discovery		Data Staged (2)	Port	to Cloud Account	Shutdown/Reboot	
					Flow (11)	Process Injection (11)	Impair Defenses (7)	II Steal or Forge	Peripheral Device		Email	Protocol Tunneling		
					Implant Internal Image	Scheduled	Indicator Removal on Host (6)	Kerberos Tickets (4)	II Discovery		Collection (3) Input Capture (4) Remote Access			
					Modify	Task/Job (7)	Indirect Command	Steal Web	Permission Groups Discovery (3)					
					Authentication Process (4)	Valid Accounts (4)	Execution	Session Cookie	Process Discovery	-	Man in the Browser	Software		
					Office		Masquerading (6)	Two-Factor Authentication	Query Registry		Man-in-the-	Traffic Signaling (1)		
					Application Startup ₍₆₎	"	Modify Authentication Process (4)	Interception	Remote System		Middle (2)	Web Service (3)		
					Pre-OS Boot (5)		Modify Cloud Compute	Unsecured Credentials (7)	Discovery		Screen Capture			
					Scheduled		Infrastructure (4)		Software Discovery (1) System Information	"	Video Capture			
					Task/Job ₍₇₎ Server Software		Modify Registry Modify System Image (2)		Discovery					
					Component (3)		Network Boundary		System Location Discovery					
					Traffic Signaling ₍₁₎		Bridging (1)	11	System Network					
JURE					Valid		Obfuscated Files or Information (5)	n	Configuration Discovery (1)	п				17
1					Accounts (4)		Pre-OS Boot (5)		System Network					17
7							Process Injection (11)		Connections Discovery					
							(11)		System Owner/User					

Mapping of Stuxnet on the ATT&CK for ICS Matrix



Knowledge Check (2)

The MITRE ATT&CK Framework consists of techniques employed by:

- Domestic Terrorists
- Script Kiddies
- Environmental Hacktivists
- □ APT Groups



APT Case Studies

The following section provides case studies of MITRE ATT&CK identified APT groups:

China (APT 12)


"Numbered Panda"

Iran (APT 33) • "Elfin"

Russia (APT 28)


"Fancy Bear"





APT 12 | China (Numbered Panda)

- MITRE ATT&CK[®] Framework TTPs
 - Initial Access
 - Execution
 - Command and Control
- APT 12 IOCs:
 - Current IOC profile denotes focus on the human element of the target enterprise, gaining access with social engineering and obtaining command and control¹.
- Group G0005 | MITRE ATT&CK[®]





APT 12 | China (Numbered Panda), cont

Description

- A China-attributed threat group that targets media outlets, tech companies and multiple governments
- Believed to be operating since 2009
- Though this group typically targeted East Asia, in 2012 they are believed to have breached the New York Times

Tools and Techniques

- DNS Calculation: multiplying the first two octets of an IP address and adding the third octet to that value in order to get a resulting command and control port.
- Phishing: sending emails with malicious Microsoft Office documents and PDFs attached.
- User execution/ malicious file: get victims to open malicious Word and PDF files sent via spearphishing
- Web Service Bidirectional Communication: used blogs and WordPress for C2 infrastructure

Associated Groups

IXESHE, DynCalc, and DNSCALC



APT 33 | Iran (Elfin)

MITRE ATT&CK[®] Framework TTPs


Initial Access

Credential Access

- Execution
- Persistence
- Privilege Escalation
- Defense Evasion

- Discovery
- Collection
- Command and Control
- Exfiltration

- APT 33 IOCs:
 - Current IOC profile denotes focus on the human element of the target enterprise, gaining access with social engineering and obtaining command and control moving laterally and escalating privileges as needed to eventually exfil data¹.
 - APT 33 known to use a multitude of tools with known IOCs, which may indicate either lack of novel sophistication OR the **use of obfuscation** to cover true objectives/intent; they're patient and tend to linger once they are in.
- Group G0064 | MITRE ATT&CK[®]





¹These are the highlighted knowns for this threat actor but does not define the entire TTP executed by threat actor.

APT 33 | Iran (Elfin), cont

Description

 A suspected Iranian threat group that targeted organizations across multiple industries in the US, Saudi Arabia, and South Korea, notably in the aviation and energy sectors

This group is believed to be formed no later than 2013

Tools and Techniques


- A dropper program (written in Farsi) to deploy a wiper application that installs a backdoor
- Spearphishing emails loaded with malicious code to deliver the program to victims
- Impersonates commercial entities (i.e. Boeing and Northrop Grumman) through registered web domains

Associated Groups

HOLMIUM

APT 28 | Russia (Fancy Bear)

- MITRE ATT&CK[®] Framework IOCs
 - ALL Enterprise Levels
- APT 28:
 - Current IOC profile denotes focus on the human element of the target enterprise to gain access but leverages a multitude of TTPs throughout the lifecycle to achieve intended objective(s)¹.
 - Indicates ability of a state backed organization to leverage a wide array of resources.
- Group G0007 | MITRE ATT&CK[®]





APT 28 | Russia (Fancy Bear), cont

Description

- This Russia-attributed threat group targeted the Hillary Clinton campaign, the Democratic National Committee, and the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee in 2016 to interfere with the U.S. presidential election.
 - This group is believed to be operating since at least 2004.

Tools and Techniques

- Spearphishing emails with zero-day vulnerabilities were delivered to victims
- Fancy Bear has consistently been updating their malware since 2007
- They periodically wipe log events and rest timestamps to avoid forensic analysis of their hacks

Associated Groups

SNAKEMACKEREL, Swallowtail, Group 74, Sednit, Sofacy, Pawn Storm, STRONTIUM, Tsar Team, Threat Group-4127, and TG-4127

Knowledge check





Knowledge Check (3)

This is the application of scientific investigatory techniques to cyber-related crimes:

- □ The Locard Principle
- Digital Forensics
- Bayesian Analysis
- □ Computer Engineering



Knowledge Check (4)

The forensics hunt and incident response tool developed by CISA is called:

SPARK

CHIRP

UASI

□ CyberTrace



Knowledge Check (4)

The APT group number 33 is affiliated with which country:

China

Russia

Iran

Brazil



Knowledge Check, extra credit

The APT group number 33 is affiliated with which country:

China

Russia

Iran

Brazil



Resources

- DHS Office of Cybersecurity and Communications- Federal Network Resiliency Division: High Value Asset Control Overlay- January 2021
 - https://www.cisa.gov/publication/high-value-asset-control-overlay
- CISA Insights: What Every Leader Needs to Know About the Ongoing APT Cyber Activity
 - https://www.cisa.gov/publication/what-every-leader-needs-know-about-ongoing-apt-cyber-activity
- MITRE | ATT&CK Matrix for Enterprise
 - https://attack.mitre.org
- US-CERT Indicator Alerts & Bulletins
 - https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts
 - https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/bulletins
- Best Practices for MITRE ATT&CK Mapping
 - https://us-cert.cisa.gov/best-practices-mitre-attckr-mapping



